Telecom competition

Introduction

This book is a well-thought-out work on telecommunications reform and competition. The book covers issues such as telecommunications regulation, market opening, pricing, interconnection between networks, and universal services. Analysis, with unique, novel and enlightening insights. The book not only conducts in-depth theoretical analysis and discussion on the telecommunications reforms that have been carried out in developed countries from the perspective of competition and regulation, but also provides insightful views on the focal issues of reform and competition in the telecommunications field from the perspective of economic theory. . The content of this book will provide useful references and references for China's telecommunications industry in terms of reform, development, competition, and effective regulation in terms of economic theory.

Book Catalog

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1　Introduction

1.1.1　Incentive Reform

1.1 .2　Liberalization

1.2　Telecom Industry Overview

1.3　Regulatory Reform

1.3.1　The Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the United States

1.3.1.1　Local call market entry

1.3.1.2　Interconnection protocol

1.3.1.3　List of RBOC entering long-distance business

1.3.1.4　Universal service

1.3.2　Reforms in other countries: Britain, New Zealand and Europe

1.3.2.1　UK

1.3.2.2　New Zealand

1.3.2.3　Europe

Chapter 2 Incentive Regulations

2.1　The Principles of Economics: Performance-based Regulations

2.1.1　The Basic Principles of Performance-based Regulations

2.1.1.1　A procurement example

2.1.1.2　Incentive, or withdraw rent

2.1.1.3　There is no one-size-fits-all model

2.1.1.4　Why rent-seeking is costly

2.1.1.5　Market competition and monitoring enable the implementation of high-performance incentive programs

2.1.1.6　How much performance needs to be measured

2.1.2　Three factors restricting incentive efficiency

2.1.2.1　Caring about quality

2.1.2.2　Regulating commitment

2.1.2.3　 Regulation Captive

2.2　The Principles of Economics: Pricing for Customer Service

2.2.1　Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing and Market Rules

2.2.1.1　Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing< /p>

2.2.1.2　Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing and Incentive Regulation

2.2.2　Maximum Price

2.2.3　 Further explanation and amendment

2.2.3.2 　Non-linear pricing

2.2.3.3 　Externality

2.2.4　 The four restricting the use of Ramsey pricing method One factor

2.2.4.1　Redistribution concerns

2.2.4.2　Regulatory prisoners

2.2.4.3　 Opportunism and non-discrimination rules in the public sector

2.2.4.4　Single cost recovery method and budget division

2.2.5　Structural separation and access pricing for independently owned infrastructure< /p>

2.3　Practical aspects

2.3.1　From rate of return regulation to price ceiling regulation

2.3.1.1　 rate of return regulation and review procedures

2.3.1.2　Maximum price regulation

2.3.2　Difficulties in maximum price practice

2.3.3　Weight setting under conditions of incomplete information

Chapter 3 Infrastructure and One-Way Access: Theory

3.1　Background

3.2　Principles of Economics

3.2.1　Cost Compensation Issue

3.2.2　Effective access pricing: a fair arena

3.2.3　Application

3.2.3.1　Application example 1: Three-level price discrimination in the retail market (Access pricing based on elasticity)

3.2.3.2　Application example 2: The impact of value creation and business entry (access pricing based on cross-flexibility)

3.2.3.3　application Example 3: Secondary price discrimination in the retail market

3.2.3.4　Application Example 4: Access pricing during peak load periods

3.2.4　Access bonus or retail tax< /p>

3.2.5　Relation to the pricing rules of active ingredients

3.2.6　Summary

3.3　Theory refinement: lack of tools and multiple goals for interconnection tariffs

3.3.1　Market power of entrants

3.3.1.1　profitable entry

3.3.1.2　nonprofit entry

3.3.2 Market bypass and repeated network construction

3.3.2.1　Market bypass

3.3.2.2　Network repeated construction

3.3.3　Incentives for minimizing access fees and costs< /p>

3.3.3.1　Incentives to minimize bottleneck costs

3.3.3.2　Incentives to minimize costs in the competitive field

3.4　 Related to Ramsey Access Pricing Two special considerations and some common misunderstandings

3.4.1 　Information Needs

3.4.2 　The debate on "fair and non-discriminatory" access prices

Chapter 4 Infrastructure and One-Way Access: Policies

4.1　General issues about access policy design

4.1.1　Asset embezzlement brought by liberalization and deregulation

p>

4.1.2　Definement of various services

4.1.3　Information requirements and supervision of rule implementation

4.2　Retrospective cost-based access pricing

4.3.1　Theoretical controversy

4.3.2　Case

4.3.2.1　Accounting cost distribution

4.3.2.2　Management cost distribution

4.3.3　Can cross subsidies be prevented

4.3.3.1　Comparison with the price of similar equipment sold by unrelated manufacturers

4.3.3.2　Compare with the price of selling the same equipment to external buyers

4.4　 Based on forward-looking Cost-based access pricing method

4.4.1　LRIC measurement

4.4.1.1　 knowledge about equipment cost

4.4.1.2　 network element usage forecast

4.4.1.3　Prediction of the speed of technological progress

4.4.1.4　Asset embezzlement in regulation

4.4.2　 Common costs, bonuses and deregulation Asset embezzlement

4.5　cost-based access price and exclusivity

4.5.1　Theoretical dispute

4.5.2　Excluding behavior example

4.5.3 　Exclusivity harms efficiency

4.6　The effective ingredient pricing rule and its application

4.6.1　Theoretical debate

4.6.2　A Application examples

4.7　Overall ceiling price

4.8　The motivation of overall ceiling price and exclusive behavior

Chapter 5 Multiple bottlenecks and two-way access

5.1　Background

5.2　The inefficiency of non-cooperative access pricing

5.3　Wholesale agreements really promote retail collusion? Comparison with patent joint ventures

5.4　Application in the pricing of two-way access in the telecommunications industry

5.4.1　Endogenous marginal cost

5.4.2　Network competition

5.5　High access tariffs are not Four reasons to encourage collusion

5.5.1　Evasion of access tax by expanding market share

5.5.2　Non-linear pricing

5.5.3　 Based on Price Discrimination for Access

5.5.4　Receiver Subsidy

5.6　Sub-lease and equipment-based entry

5.6.1　Sub-lease-based entry< /p>

5.6.2　Access based on equipment

5.6.2.1　No price discrimination based on termination

5.6.2.2　Price discrimination based on termination

5.7　Other policies

5.7.1　Called party pays

5.7.2　Multiple termination lines

Chapter 6 Universal Service

6.1　Necessity of a new paradigm

6.2　The basis of universal service

6.2.1　Negative effects of tax regulation

6.2.2　Views in favor of indirect tax

6.2.2.1　Incomplete observation of sources of inequality

6.2.2.2　Consumption externalities

6.2. 2.3　Other factors

6.3　The 1996 U.S. Telecommunications Act and Universal Service Obligations

6.3.1　Existing Plan

6.3.2　Reform Project

6.3.2.1　Using the agency model to determine universal service subsidy preferences

6.3.3　Some difficulties

6.3.3.1　Common problems affecting the agency model

6.3.3.2 　The difference between technology cost and opportunity cost

6.3.3.3　Define geographic area

6.4　Universal service auction

6.4.1　The current plan

6.4.1.1　GTE’s plan

6.4.2　 the benefits of competition in the market

6.4.3　 some further difficulties

6.4.3.1　Asymmetry due to historical reasons

6.4.3.2　Universal services provided by non-equipment-based entrants

6.4.3.3　Lack of combined auctions

Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1　Internet and Internet Phone

7.1.1　Broadband Access

7.1.2　Commercial Internet Interconnection

7.2　Regulatory system

7.2.1　Uncertainty factors: innovation, integration, diversification and globalization of operators

7.2.2　The structure of the regulatory system: theoretical thinking

7.2.2　The structure of the regulatory system: theoretical thinking

7.2.2.1　One and multiple regulators

7.2.2.2　Federal regulation and state regulation

7.2.3　Comparison of competition policy and regulatory policy

7.2.3.1　Towards the demise of regulation

Glossary

Translator's postscript